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A B S T R A C T   
Indicative conditionals—that is, sentences typically, though not exclusively, of the form “If p, (then) q,”—belong 
to the most puzzling phenomena of language. One of the puzzles that has recently attracted attention of psy-
chologists of reasoning stems from the fact that on the majority of accounts of indicative conditionals, “If p, 
(then) q” can be true, or at least highly acceptable, even when there is no meaningful connection between p and 
q. Conditionals without such a connection, dubbed missing-link conditionals, however, often seem very odd. A 
standard pragmatic account of their oddity rests on an observation that, whenever missing-link conditionals 
come out as true, these are situations in which speakers are justified in asserting stronger, more informative 
statements. Asserting a less informative statement is odd because it is a violation of the Maxim of Quantity. This 
paper reports four experiments that present a challenge to the Gricean explanation of why missing-link condi-
tionals are odd. At the same time, we will argue that these findings can be reconciled with general principles of 
Gricean pragmatics, if the connection is treated as a part of a conventional, “core” meaning of a conditional.   
Introduction 
When we make decisions or plans, solve problems or give advice, we 
phrase a lot of what we say or think as indicative conditionals, that is, 
sentences typically, though not exclusively, of the form “If p, then q,” 
where p, the if-clause, is called the antecedent, and q, the main clause, is 
called the consequent.1 We use such sentences in our everyday conver-
sations, in the context of science, in public debates—in all contexts in 
which we might communicate reasons, talk about causal relations, or 
make inferences. For instance, someone preparing a dinner party might 
think:  
(1) If I add too much chilli to the curry, John will complain. 
A politician could argue that:  
(2) If we lower taxes, we will not have sufficient resources to fund 
social security benefits. 
Similarly, a biologist teaching about marine animals might state:  
(3) If an animal has gills, it can breathe under water. 
What the three sentences above have in common is that their ante-
cedents express a condition under which their consequents occur or from 
which they can be derived. More specifically, (1) conveys that too much 
chilli in the curry would cause (be a reason for) John to complain. 
Likewise, (2) conveys that lower taxes would result in insufficient funds 
for social security. And (3) conveys that gills allow breathing under-
water. In other words, these everyday uses of conditionals seem to be 
about connections between their antecedents and con-
sequents—connections that are, for instance, inferential, evidential, or 
causal. 
Despite these widespread intuitions, very few theories of condi-
tionals take the connection to be part of the “core” meaning of the 
conditional. In fact, most well-established philosophical and psycho-
logical theories of conditionals validate a principle that leaves no room 
for the connection, the Principle of Conjunctive Sufficiency, also known as 
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Centering or and-to-if inference. This principle allows us to infer condi-
tionals from conjunctions. On the theories that validate it, knowing that 
“p and q” is true suffices to establish that “if p then q” holds. This 
inference is allowed whether or not there is a meaningful link between p 
and q. For instance, if someone knows that great white sharks are 
predators and that they can breathe under water, they are committed to 
accepting the following conditional:  
(4) If great white sharks are predators, then they can breathe under 
water. 
The Principle of Conjunctive Sufficiency has recently attracted 
attention in the psychology of reasoning (see, e.g., Cruz, Over, Oaksford, 
& Baratgin, 2016; Krzyżanowska & Douven, 2018; Skovgaard-Olsen, 
Kellen, Hahn, & Klauer, 2019; Vidal & Baratgin, 2017), because, 
despite its counterintuitive consequences, it is validated by many of the 
most prominent accounts of conditionals such as the material account 
(Jackson, 1987; Grice, 1989), and possible worlds account (Stalnaker, 
1968; Stalnaker, 1975). It is also probabilistically valid, or p-valid, on the 
Suppositional Theory (Adams, 1975; Cruz, Over, Oaksford, & Baratgin, 
2016; Edgington, 1995; Evans & Over, 2004). At the same time, the 
departure from Conjunctive Sufficiency is characteristic of inferentialist 
approaches which place the connection between a conditional’s ante-
cedent and its consequent at the core of the meaning of the conditional, 
although what that means exactly depend on the particular account (see, 
e.g., Douven, 2008; Douven et al., 2018; Douven et al., 2020; Krzy-
żanowska et al., 2013; Krzyżanowska et al., 2014; Skovgaard-Olsen 
et al., 2017; Skovgaard-Olsen et al., 2016; van Rooij and Schulz, 2019; 
the inferentialist view on conditionals can also be attributed to earlier 
philosophers such as Mill, 1843; Strawson, 1986; Mackie, 1973, and 
even Ramsey, 1929/1990.). 
It bears emphasis that the proponents of the inferentialist accounts 
do not claim that their analysis applies to all sentences whose subordi-
nate clause is introduced by “if” (see, e.g., Krzyżanowska, 2015, 
pp. 11–14, 24 or Douven, 2016, pp. 11–16). In particular, they explic-
itly exclude as requiring a different treatment sentences that look like 
conditionals but have been argued to be semantically different, labelled 
nonconditional conditionals by Geis and Lycan (1993), such as, for 
instance, biscuit conditionals (“There are biscuits on the sideboard if you 
want them”), in which the antecedent provides the condition under 
which the speaker’s utterance of the consequent is pragmatically rele-
vant, and whose consequent can be asserted on its own (Declerck and 
Reed, 2001, pp. 320–321). Another example of nonconditional condi-
tionals are concessive or non-interference conditionals (e.g. “Even if she is 
starving, Mary won’t eat those biscuits”). As in the case of biscuit con-
ditionals and unlike in genuine indicative conditionals, a speaker who 
asserts a non-interference conditional seems to be asserting its conse-
quent, too. Moreover, there is clear empirical evidence that non- 
interference conditionals are interpreted differently than indicatives: 
more specifically, people’s probability and acceptability ratings of these 
conditionals are not affected by the same factors (Skovgaard-Olsen et al., 
2016). Importantly, however, non-interference conditionals should not 
be perceived simply as acceptable missing-link conditionals that infer-
entialism conveniently rules out; these are not conditionals whose an-
tecedents can be replaced by anything whatsoever. In fact, these 
sentences too can be treated in a broadly inferentialist vein. Such a 
treatment was proposed by Skovgaard-Olsen (2016) who analysed non- 
interference conditionals as conveying that the antecedent is not a 
sufficient reason against the consequent. 
While the inferentialist accounts differ in how they construe the 
connection, none renders a conditional like (4) acceptable unless one 
can show that there is some kind of relationship between the contents of 
its clauses—in this case: between being a predator and the ability to 
breathe under water. For this reason, inferentialist theories consider 
Conjunctive Sufficiency invalid.2 It should be noted, however, that 
invalidating Conjunctive Sufficiency does not necessarily lead to the 
emphasis on the connection between antecedents and consequents. The 
new revised version of the Mental Models Theory (Johnson-Laird et al., 
2015; Khemlani et al., 2018), for instance, does not validate inferences 
from conjunctions to conditionals, yet missing-link conditionals, such as 
(4), can come out as true on this account. 
Must the theories that validate Conjunctive Sufficiency, or the 
Mental Models Theory, then, hold that sentences such as (4) are 
perfectly normal? Not necessarily. Such a theory can say that from 
“Great white sharks are predators and can breathe under water” one can 
infer: “If Great white sharks are predators, then they can breathe under 
water,” and, consequently, that the conclusions of such inferences are 
acceptable as true (on truth-conditional accounts) or highly probable 
(on non-propositional, probabilistic accounts). But the theory can add 
that sentences that are, in principle, highly probable or true can be, at 
the same time, unassertable, that is, they can be odd things to utter in 
normal conversations. Interestingly, the data seem inconclusive about 
people’s endorsement of Conjunctive Sufficiency, with different studies 
pointing in different directions (see, e.g., Cruz, Over, Oaksford, & Bar-
atgin, 2016; Krzyżanowska & Douven, 2018; Skovgaard-Olsen, Kellen, 
Hahn, & Klauer, 2019; Vidal & Baratgin, 2017). However, even those 
researchers who found evidence supporting Conjunctive Sufficiency 
acknowledge that people might hesitate to accept a conditional whose 
clauses are not connected, though they attribute it to the way people use 
conditionals in natural conversations (Cruz et al., 2016; see also Over 
et al., 2007). 
Conversation is governed by natural language pragmatics, that 
aspect of language that allows speakers to express more than they 
literally say and allows hearers to infer what the speakers mean (Grice, 
1989; see also Birner, 2012 for a helpful introduction). For instance, 
imagine a speaker who says “it is a bit cold in here, isn’t it?” The speaker 
literally makes a statement about the temperature, followed by a ques-
tion inviting agreement. The statement is true or false, on some value of 
“cold.” But beyond the literal meaning, the speaker might intend to 
convey a request to close the window. This intended meaning would 
have no bearing on the truth value of the literal statement. Similarly, if a 
professor asserts “some of my students passed the exam” she might be 
implying (more technically, “implicating”) that not all of her students 
did, although, from a logical point of view, the sentence would be true in 
the situation in which all students passed. But if the professor uttered 
this sentence in a context in which we know that she had only marked, 
say, two out of many exam scripts, and both received a passing grade, 
the implicature would not arise (e.g. Bott and Noveck, 2004). 
Pragmatics offers a set of possible explanations for why conclusions 
of sound and valid inferences, or true statements in general, are not 
always assertable in conversation. In principle, then, pragmatics may 
also be able to explain why we find missing-link conditionals unassert-
able, and why we perceive conditionals as conveying a connection be-
tween their antecedents and consequents. What this would mean is that 
the connection is non-literal, non-conventional, context-dependent, 
inferential, and not truth-conditional (on this understanding of 
2 How the validity is precisely defined here depends on the specific theory. 
Note that what matters for our purposes is the contrast between theories on 
which one can infer a conditional from a conjunction, and those on which the 
conjunction is not sufficient to infer a conditional. This is why, in this paper, we 
abstract away from any particular details of the formal systems that underlie 
discussed theories. 
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pragmatics, see, e.g., Birner, 2012). Traditionally, pragmatic meaning is 
contrasted with the semantic meaning. If the perceived connection were 
semantic, it would be literal, conventional, truth-conditional and inde-
pendent of the context of the utterance.3 
Along these lines, (Over et al. (2007, p. 92) proposed that anyone 
who takes the natural-language conditional to be probabilistic—its 
meaning closely tied to the Equation, that is, the equality between the 
probability of a conditional, Pr(If p, q), and corresponding conditional 
probability, Pr(q |p)—can argue that: 
…the use of a conditional pragmatically suggests, in certain ordinary 
contexts, that p raises the probability of q or that p causes q. 
A similar take on the connection between p and q might be found in the 
Mental Models Theory: 
We do not deny that many conditionals are interpreted as conveying 
a relation between their antecedents and consequents. However, the 
core meaning alone does not signify any such relation. (Johnson- 
Laird and Byrne, 2002, p. 651) 
Information can be added about different temporal, spatial, or causal 
relations between antecedents and consequents through a processes of 
pragmatic modulation (Johnson-Laird and Byrne, 2002; Quelhas et al., 
2010; Khemlani et al., 2018). However, the proponents of the Mental 
Models Theory argue that many missing-link conditionals, like the 
sentence below, should be perfectly acceptable:  
(5) If there was a circle on the board, then there was a triangle on the 
board, though there was no relation, connection, or constraint, 
between the two—they merely happened to co-occur. (Johnson- 
Laird and Byrne, 2002, p. 651) 
Later in the paper, we will discuss the Mental Models account in greater 
detail. 
If a pragmatic explanation is to be persuasive, we need to know what 
specific pragmatic phenomenon is at work. While it has been argued that 
no satisfactory pragmatic account of the oddity of missing-link condi-
tionals has been developed (Douven, 2017), some suggestions have been 
made nonetheless. One possibility is that, when a conditional lacks some 
kind of relevance between antecedent and consequent, it violates 
discourse coherence (Cruz, Over, Oaksford, & Baratgin, 2016 made a 
related suggestion). After all, any two consecutive elements of discourse 
will sound odd if they are not on the same topic. However, Krzy-
żanowska et al. (2017) showed that even if the discourse establishes a 
coherence relation between the clauses of a conditional, that is not 
enough to make the conditional a sensible thing to say. A stronger 
relationship is required, for instance, that of the positive probabilistic 
relevance which holds whenever the antecedent raises the probability of 
the consequent. 
Another, influential pragmatic explanation was suggested by Grice 
(1989), who did not deny that conditionals convey the presence of a 
strong, inferential connection between their clauses, but he insisted that 
their semantic, conventional meaning is fully captured by the material 
account of conditionals. The connection is, according to Grice, non-
conventionally implicated (Grice, 1989, pp. 76–78). In developing the 
explanation of the oddness of missing-link conditionals, Grice was thus 
concerned with explaining away the so-called paradoxes of material 
implication, but a pragmatic explanation devised for those can be 
extended to deal with the counter-intuitive consequences of Conjunctive 
Sufficiency. Grice proposed that: 
To say that “p ⊃ q” is to say something logically weaker than to deny 
that p or to assert that q, and is thus less informative; to make a less 
informative rather than a more informative statement is to offend 
against the first Maxim of Quantity, provided that the more infor-
mative statement, if made, would be of interest. There is a general 
presumption that in the case of “p ⊃ q,” a more informative state-
ment would be of interest (Grice, 1989, p. 61). 
Since conditionals with a true antecedent and consequent are obviously 
instances of conditionals with a true consequent, if one supports a theory 
that endorses Conjunctive Sufficiency, one could explain the oddness of 
missing-link conditionals with true clauses in exactly the same way. (In 
fact, the same strategy could be used, in principle, in defence of the 
Mental Models Theory.) In such cases, one could argue that when a 
speaker is justified in asserting the conjunction of the antecedent and 
consequent, they should assert that conjunction because it is more 
informative than the conditional, and hence the conditional is unas-
sertable. For instance, (4) is rendered true, or, on the Suppositional 
Theory, highly acceptable, since both “great white sharks are predators” 
and “great white sharks can breathe under water” are true. But precisely 
because the speaker knows that both clauses are true, they should assert 
the conjunction and not the conditional. That is, they should assert: 
“Great white sharks are predators and they can breathe under water.” If 
they choose to assert the conditional instead, they violate the maxim of 
Quantity. 
The Maxim of Quantity might prevent speakers from asserting con-
ditionals that have true antecedents and consequents—which we will 
henceforth call TT conditionals—such as (4). However, it does not 
explain why those sentences seem to suggest that their clauses are 
connected, that is why, e.g., (4) suggests that being a predator has 
something to do with the ability to breathe under water. Furthermore, as 
observed by Douven (2008, p. 23), if this approach is correct, we should 
not assert any TT conditionals, including those that are, intuitively, 
perfectly felicitous, for instance:  
(6) If great white sharks have gills, then they can breathe under 
water. 
Yet, contrary to (4), that both “great white sharks have gills” and “they 
can breathe under water” are true does not make the above conditional a 
strange thing to say at all. In fact, it could be asserted by someone 
explaining, say in the context of a classroom, anatomy and physiology of 
marine animals. Moreover, in such a context, it might be even preferable 
to the corresponding conjunction, since “great white sharks have gills 
and they can breathe under water” does not convey the information 
about the dependence of the ability to breathe under water on being 
equipped with gills. In other words, there is a crucial difference between 
(4) and (6) which makes the former odd and the latter assertable, and 
which is completely overlooked by the Gricean approach to the condi-
tionals with true clauses. What has been missing is that conditionals 
whose clauses are reasonably connected may be assertable even if the 
conjunction of these clauses is assertable too. 
We should note here that we have chosen to refer to the above 
proposal as “Gricean” rather than “Grice’s” carefully, as we have 
extrapolated from Grice’s own writings. Firstly, Grice was not concerned 
with Conjunctive Sufficiency but rather with the paradoxes of material 
implication. Secondly, Grice himself discussed a demand for non-truth- 
functional evidence for a conditional to be assertable. The above cited 
passage purports only to explain why people might be reluctant to 
accept missing-link conditionals that are true in virtue of their under-
lying semantics; it is by no means Grice’s last word on conditionals. But 
this passage is nonetheless an attractive proposal, especially in the 
context of the psychology of reasoning debate on Conjunctive Suffi-
ciency and its counterintuitive consequences, and as such it merits an 
empirical investigation. 
The connection between antecedent and consequent can be 
3 From a linguistic point of view, this is a somewhat old-fashioned way to 
introduce the semantics-pragmatics distinction. We will discuss this point in 
detail in the General Discussion. 
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construed in a number of ways. Probabilistically, it can be construed in 
terms of probabilistic relevance (e.g. Over et al., 2007; Oberauer et al., 
2007; Skovgaard-Olsen et al., 2016; van Rooij and Schulz, 2019) or 
through an evidential support relation (Douven, 2008; Douven, 2016).4 
Alternatively it can be characterised in terms of inferential relations 
(see, e.g., Declerck & Reed, 2001; Verbrugge, Dieussaert, Schaeken, 
Smessaert, & Belle, 2007), which could be deductive, inductive, or 
abductive, or any combination thereof (Douven and Verbrugge, 2010; 
Krzyżanowska et al., 2013; Krzyżanowska et al., 2014). Relatedly, the 
connection can be understood as a strong argument from the antecedent 
(together with contextually salient background premises) to the conse-
quent, possibly involving multiple inferential steps (Douven et al., 2018; 
Douven et al., 2020). Since all these proposals seem to aim at capturing a 
pre-theoretic notion, we do not assume any particular formalism and 
rely on an intuitive understanding of the connection. 
The presence or absence of a connection between p and q might not 
be the only factor that can influence whether or not we find conditionals 
with true clauses felicitous. In fact, extensive overviews of different 
types of conditionals that can be found in the linguistic literature (see, e. 
g, Declerck and Reed, 2001) reveal that conditionals can be charac-
terised and classified in many different ways. Traditionally, most psy-
chological and philosophical research has focused on the broad category 
of indicative conditionals, of which a prototypical example would be “If 
Oswald didn’t kill Kennedy, someone else did,” as opposed to subjunctive 
conditionals such as “If Oswald hadn’t killed Kennedy, someone else 
would have.” However, linguistic data suggest that the broad category of 
indicative conditionals is not a homogeneous class and far too general to 
be useful in understanding how people use and reason with conditionals 
in natural language. One pragmatically relevant distinction that has 
been emphasised in the psychology of reasoning literature (see, e.g., 
Cruz & Oberauer, 2014; Evans, Handley, & Over, 2003; Gazzo Casta-
ñeda & Knauff, 2018; Khemlani, Byrne, & Johnson-Laird, 2018) might 
be whether the antecedents and consequents of conditionals are about 
specific individuals, or if they are generics, that is, about whole classes of 
object (cf. Papafragou, 1996). There is evidence for the significance of 
this distinction in extant experiments on Conjunctive Sufficiency: con-
ditionals might be more or less acceptable or assertable depending on 
the content of their clauses. For instance, some of the stimuli used in 
these experiments are about specific objects, e.g., “If the next Amri bird 
you see on Liaku will eat arb seeds, then the next next Amri bird you see 
on Liaku will build its nests on arb trees” (Cruz, Over, Oaksford, & 
Baratgin, 2016), while others are generic statements, for instance, about 
whole classes of objects, e.g., “If birds are animals, some animals can fly” 
(Krzyżanowska and Douven, 2018). 
Following the example of Evans et al. (2003), most experimental 
studies on conditionals and conditional probability have been focused 
on conditionals with specific, and not generic, content. This lacuna has 
been addressed recently by Cruz, Baratgin, Oaksford, & Over, 2015 who 
investigated whether the Equation also holds for conditionals that are 
equivalent to statements of the form “all ps are qs.” In a more logical 
setting, also, Gazzo Castañeda and Knauff (2018) observed that the 
endorsement rates for conditional arguments was affected by the 
phrasing of the premises and conclusions. The conclusions of both valid 
(Modus Ponens and Modus Tollens) and invalid (Acceptance of the 
Consequent and Denial of the Antecedent) inferences were accepted to a 
greater extent when they involved specific terms. We hypothesise that 
such differences in phrasing might also influence people’s endorsement 
of and-to-if inferences, and, consequently, their evaluations of TT con-
ditionals. In particular, if the felicity of conditionals with true clauses is 
affected by their specificity, we might be able to explain some of the 
discrepancies between different studies on the Conjunctive Sufficiency.5 
This paper considers four research questions. (1) Are TT conditionals 
less assertable than corresponding conjunctions—that is, conjunctions 
of their antecedents and consequents—in the same contexts, as follows 
from Gricean pragmatics? (2) Does an inferential connection between 
antecedent and consequent increase the assertability of TT con-
ditionals—and how assertable are these inferentially connected condi-
tionals? (3) Is any such increase in assertability special to conditionals or 
does it hold also for corresponding conjunctions (in all experiments) and 
disjunctions (in Experiment 2)? (4) Does the assertability of a condi-
tional depend on whether it concerns sentences with generic content 
(types) or their specific instances (tokens)? Finally, we will discuss the 
implications of our results in the context of other recent experimental 
findings on the semantics and pragmatics of conditionals, and how they 
relate to recent debates concerning the semantics-pragmatics interface. 
Experiment 1 
As we have explained above, on Gricean grounds, when a speaker 
knows both clauses of a conditional to be true, they should not assert 
that conditional, since, by asserting it, they violate the Maxim of 
Quantity. In such situations, a conjunction of the antecedent and 
consequent should be preferable to a conditional. In this experiment, we 
probe whether people really judge TT conditionals to be unassertable, 
or, at least, less assertable than the corresponding conjunctions. We 
compared how people evaluate conditionals with how they evaluate 
conjunctions consisting of the same true clauses, in the same conversa-
tional contexts. Furthermore, we were interested in factors that may 
affect people’s evaluations of the assertability of a conditional: the 
presence of an inferential connection between antecedent and conse-
quent and the type of content the clauses of the conditional express. 
The content of a sentence is generic when it is a generalisation about 
types of objects, or their classes, such as roses, sharks, or microwave 
ovens (e.g. Leslie & Lerner, 2016). The content is specific when it is 
about an object token, such as a particular rose or a particular micro-
wave oven the participants of a conversation have in mind or see in front 
of them. The specificity of the object can be marked by a demonstrative, 
such as “this.” Consequently, we can distinguish between type (specific) 
and token (generic) conditionals:   
Type: If roses are plants, then roses need water.   
Token: If this rose is a plant, then it needs water. 
For our experiments we chose sentences consisting of clauses that 
expressed known, uncontroversial facts, e.g., “roses are flowers” or “no 
one used microwave ovens in the 19th century.” Moreover, we provided 
participants with a context in which two speakers exchanged informa-
tion about the relevant subject matter. The contexts established that the 
truth of these clauses was known to both speakers. Additionally, the 
contexts were accompanied by a picture of (an example of) the object 
the conversation was about to give the phrase “this [noun]” in the Token 
condition a clear referent. To make the exchange of information about 
well known facts more realistic, we used a context of a classroom in 
which a teacher and pupils first discussed a certain topic, and then the 
teacher encouraged the pupils to summarise what they had learned. A 
pupil asserted a conjunction of two true statements on the given topic, “p 
and q,” and the teacher acknowledged the correctness of the pupil’s 
assertion by responding with “Yes, p and q” or “Yes, if p then q.” Fig. 1 
4 See Skovgaard-Olsen et al. (2017) for an experimental comparison of these 
two measures. 
5 Cf. Krzyżanowska et al. (2017). See also Khemlani et al. (2018, pp. 14-15) 
for a discussion of different verification strategies for generic and specific 
assertions. 
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shows an example of an item used in the experiment.6 The full list of 
experimental items can be found at: https://osf.io/uyk6e/. 
Our test followed a 2 × 2 × 2 factorial design with sentence type 
(conditionals, “If” vs. conjunctions, “And”), content of the clauses 
(generic, “Type” vs. specific, “Token”), and the inferential connection 
(Connected vs. Unconnected) manipulated between participants. We 
used a between-participants design to reduce the chance of demand 
characteristics resulting from an explicit contrast between conditions. 
These are examples of sentences belonging to each of the resulting 
eight groups:  
Connected:   
Type If If roses are plants, then roses need water. 
Type And Roses are plants, and roses need water. 
Token If If this rose is a plant, then it needs water. 
Token And This rose is a plant, and it needs water.    
Unconnected:   
Type If If roses are plants, then roses have thorns. 
Type And Roses are plants, and roses have thorns. 
Token If If this rose is a plant, then it has thorns. 
Token And This rose is a plant, and it has thorns.   
Finally, we asked participants to evaluate the extent to which the test 
sentences are reasonable things to utter in given contexts by means of 
two different questions: 
Fig. 1. An example of a vignette used in Experiment 1. The item belongs to the If-Type-Unconnected condition.  
6 The photograph of the rose is by Forest & Kim Starr (http://www.sta 
rrenvironmental.com) licensed under Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 
Unported Licence (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/). Source: 
Wikimedia Commons, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File%3AStarr_0 
70402-6236_Rosa_sp..jpg [retrieved on March 13, 2017]. 
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Assertability: 
“In this context, would it be natural for [the teacher] to assert: …” 
Sense: 
“In this context, would it make sense for [the teacher] to say: …” 
Participants were asked to mark their responses on a 7-point Likert 
scale, labelled from “extremely natural” to “extremely unnatural” for the 
assertability question, and from “definitely yes” to “definitely no” in the 
sense question. 
Methods 
Participants. 245 individuals participated in the online survey posted 
on the MTurk platform (https://www.mturk.com/) and received a small 
remuneration for their effort. We removed 7 participants’ data: 6 whose 
first (native) language was not English, and one whose data was 
incomplete. Of the remaining 238 participants, 129 identified as female 
and 109 identified as male. The mean age of the participants was 38.45. 
Materials and procedure. After giving informed consent, each partic-
ipant was randomly assigned to a condition. Participants in each con-
dition were presented with 8 blocks, one at a time. The order of 
presentation was randomised. Each block contained one of four vi-
gnettes consisting of a conversational context followed by a question 
about the assertability of a sentence for the speaker. Each vignette was 
presented twice: once followed by the question phrased in terms of how 
natural it would be to assert the sentence—henceforth “assertability”-
—and once in terms of how much sense it would make to say 
it—henceforth “sense”. 
Results 
Firstly, we note that the Assertability and Sense dependent variables 
yielded highly similar results, as can be seen in Figs. 2 and 3. Indeed, the 
analyses were so similar that, for brevity’s sake, we report only the 
Assertability findings here. Readers may find the analysis for the Sense 
variable in the supplementary materials, available at: https://osf. 
io/uyk6e/. We note here that, in terms of the pattern of significance, 
the findings were identical, and that estimates of all differences were 
very similar. 
Assertability. Fig. 2 shows the descriptive data. Note that here, and 
throughout, we recoded participants’ responses so that the lowest 
category (e.g. “definitely no”) is 1 and the highest category (e.g. “defi-
nitely yes”) is 7. At first glance, the figure suggests some support for 
Grice: in the top row, conjunctions are more assertable than condi-
tionals. However, this difference disappears in the bottom row. 6 out of 8 
conditions received high ratings, the exceptions being conditionals 
without an inferential connection. This pattern suggests an interaction 
between connection and sentence type, with no obvious effect of 
connection on conjunctions. Finally, the data suggests a similar pattern 
in Types and Tokens. Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics. 
We explored the data further with a mixed effects model. The model 
included main effects of Clause Content (Type/ Token), Connection 
(Connected/ Unconnected) and Sentence (And/ If), all two-way in-
teractions and the three-way interaction. We attempted to fit a model 
with the full random-effects structure justified by the design, including 
random slopes of the independent variables and their interactions by 
item and random intercepts by item and their correlation (i.e. (Content * 
Connection * Sentence | Item)). However, this model did not converge. 
The maximal converging model included the random slopes of the in-
dependent variables by item, random intercepts by item, but not their 
correlation (i.e. (Content + Connection + Sentence ‖ Item), as well as 
random intercepts by participant. All analyses in this paper were run in 
R (R Core Team, 2016), using the afex package (Singmann, Bolker, 
Westfall, & Aust, 2018) and with follow-up analyses—in this case, 
pairwise comparisons—on the estimated marginal means in the 
emmeans package (Lenth, 2018). 
Table 2 reports the fixed effects from the model. We first note that, 
unsurprisingly, sentences were rated significantly more assertable with 
an inferential connection (M = 5.58, 95% CI [5.23,5.94]) than without 
(M = 4.26 95% CI [3.91, 4.62]). The remaining effects are more rele-
vant to our research questions. For Research Question 1 the key findings 
are the main effect of Sentence and the interaction between Connection 
and Sentence. As the estimated marginal means show, participants rated 
“and” sentences (M = 5.82, 95% CI [5.43, 6.21]) significantly more 
assertable than “if” sentences (M = 4.02, 95% CI [3.63, 4.41]). But 
contrary to the Gricean account, this difference interacted with an 
inferential connection. Fig. 4 plots the estimated marginal means, and 
shows the interaction of Connection and Sentence. 
We followed up the interaction of Connection and Sentence with 
comparisons on the estimated marginal means, averaging over the levels 
of Content. These comparisons were treated as a family of 4 tests, with 
the significance level set at p = .013. These comparisons provide further 
detail on the answer to Research Question 1. These comparisons 
demonstrated that, without an inferential connection, “And” sentences 
were rated significantly more assertable than “If” sentences (MDifference =
3.38, SE = .31, t(14.8) = 10.95, p < .001), a difference of almost 
half the response scale.7 But with a connection, “And” sentences were 
rated only very slightly and non-significantly more assertable than “If” 
sentences (MDifference = .23, SE = .31, t(14.5) = .74, p = .47). The 
parameter estimate for the difference and its standard error indicate that 
the data are compatible with small differences, both positive and 
negative, between sentence types. This finding seems to contradict the 
Gricean account. 
For Research Question 2, the data showed that “If” sentences were 
rated substantially and significantly more assertable with a connection 
(MDifference = 2.90, SE = .27, t(25.1) = 10.80, p < .001). That dif-
ference corresponded to some 41.43% of the response scale. “If” sen-
tences with an inferential connection received assertability ratings 
comfortably above the midpoint of the scale, suggesting that they were 
assertable, as shown by the estimated marginal mean (M = 5.47, 95% 
CI [5.00,5.93]). For Research Question 3 the data showed that an infer-
ential connection did not benefit sentence types equally, since “And” 
sentences were rated very slightly and non-significantly less assertable 
with a connection than without (MDifference = .26, SE = .27, t(23.9) =
.96, p = .35). 
For Research Question 4, the data showed no clear effect of the type of 
content of the clauses. The main effect of Clause Content was non- 
significant. As the estimated marginal means show, Type sentences 
(M = 4.81, 95% CI [4.48, 5.14]) were rated non-significantly less 
assertable than Token sentences (M = 5.03, 95% CI [4.70,5.37]). The 
confidence intervals suggest that Type and Token sentences had broadly 
similar assertability. The Clause Content variable did not enter into 
significant interactions. 
Discussion 
Experiment 1 provided two sets of analyses (including those in the 
supplementary materials) that give consistent answers to our research 
questions. They suggest that TT conditionals need not be less assertable 
than corresponding conjunctions (Research Question 1). When there was 
an inferential connection between antecedent and consequent, condi-
tionals and conjunctions received similar ratings. In other words, TT 
conditionals were assertable in our experiment as long as there was an 
inferential connection. Inferential connections had a reliable effect with 
conditionals, leading to ratings comfortably above the midpoint of the 
scale (Research Question 2), but this effect was confined to conditionals, 
as there was no clear effect for conjunctions, suggesting the effect is 
7 Degrees of freedom were approximated for Experiment 1 with the Kenward- 
Roger method. Note that in all remaining experiments, since there were many 
more items, the asymptotic method was used, with z ratios rather than t ratios. 
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somewhat special to the conditional (Research Question 3). Finally, the 
data provide no clear evidence for an effect of type of content (Research 
Question 4). 
The experiment challenges the traditional Gricean explanation of 
why missing link conditionals are odd. For a TT conditional to be infe-
licitous it is not enough that the speaker could assert a conjunction of the 
antecedent and consequent instead. The TT conditionals were only 
judged infelicitous when they lacked the relevant connection between 
antecedent and consequent. 
We could interpret this finding as showing that English speakers 
happily assert a weaker statement even when a stronger one is war-
ranted. This speaker behaviour would undermine Gricean views on 
communication in general by showing that informativeness does not 
guide our intuitions about the assertability of various sentences. But 
while wrong in detail, our results suggest the Gricean approach may 
nevertheless be right in spirit. 
The Gricean prediction about TT conditionals rests on specific as-
sumptions about the semantics of the conditional. More specifically, it is 
presupposed that, whatever the conditional expresses, it is less infor-
mative, or weaker, than the conjunction of its clauses. If we rethink this 
assumption about the meaning of the conditional, we could maintain the 
Gricean view on language and communication. That is, we could treat 
conditionals as expressing information which is not conveyed by the 
conjunctions of their clauses. The conditional would not then be weaker 
than the conjunction, but it should not be stronger either—we do not 
want conditionals to entail the truth of their antecedents and conse-
quents. What could that piece of information be? Our findings hint at an 
answer. What conditionals, but not conjunctions, convey is an inferen-
tial connection between their clauses. Consequently, our missing-link 
conditionals are judged unassertable because they both lack an 
inferential connection and assert one. They convey something false. 
The results of the Experiment 1 surprised us in one respect. Contrary 
to previous findings (Krzyżanowska et al., 2017), the type of content 
expressed by the clauses did not have an effect on how assertable the 
sentences were or to what extent they made sense. We thus sought a 
replication while also increasing the number of items. Additionally, to 
limit the effect of any particular context of conversation, we presented 
the test sentences on their own in the Type condition or just accompa-
nied by a picture of a relevant object in the Token condition. 
Experiment 2 
Experiment 2 increased the number of items to 16 (including ver-
sions of the items from Experiment 1) and presented the items without 
contexts. We constructed test sentences with clauses whose truth we 
could expect participants to know, such as “Laptops are computers” or 
“Professional basketball players have lungs” (and, in the Token condi-
tion: “This laptop is a computer” and “This professional basketball 
player has lungs,” accompanied by a picture of a laptop and a basketball 
player, respectively). To ensure that participants indeed knew the 
clauses of the test sentences to be true, we carried out a manipulation 
check at the end of the experiment and asked participants about the 
truth values of all clauses used in the study. 
Fixing contexts (as in Experiment 1) and eliminating contexts (as in 
Experiment 2) are reasonable strategies to reduce the chance that our 
effects rest solely on the pragmatics of the embedding experimental 
context. 
Additionally, Experiment 2, compared conditionals not only to 
conjunctions of their clauses but also to disjunctions. On the original 
Gricean account of the oddity of TT conditionals, a disjunction of the 
Fig. 2. Distribution of the responses to the “assertability” question in Experiment 1.  
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negation of the antecedent and the consequent conveys exactly the same 
meaning as the corresponding conditional, as that disjunction is logi-
cally equivalent to such a conditional on the material account of the 
conditional that Grice was seeking to salvage, e.g.. 
(7) a. If I don’t have this book in my office, then I left it at home. 
b. I have this book in my office, or I left it at home. 
If the Gricean explanation of the oddity were indeed accurate, and 
the conditional were best understood as the material conditional (at 
least for TT cases), then we would expect similar patterns for both types 
of construction. Experiment 2 put this prediction to the test. 
As in the Experiment 1, we also manipulated the type of content the 
clauses of the test sentences expressed, and the presence of the 
connection between the clauses. Consequently, our test followed a 3 ×
2 × 2 factorial design with sentence type (conditionals, “If,” vs. con-
junctions, “And,” vs. disjunctions, “Or”), the type of content expressed 
by the clauses (generic, “Type” vs. specific, “Token”), and the inferential 
connection (Connected vs. Unconnected) manipulated between subject. 
These are examples of sentences belonging to Type condition: 
Connected:  
If If smartphones are telephones, then smartphones can be used to 
make phone calls.  
And Smartphones are telephones, and smartphones can be used to 
make phone calls.  
Or Smartphones aren’t telephones, or smartphones can be used to 
make phone calls. 
Unconnected:  
If If smartphones are portable, then smartphones can be used to 
make phone calls.  
And Smartphones are portable, and smartphones can be used to make 
phone calls.  
Or Smartphones aren’t portable, or smartphones can be used to 
make phone calls. 
The Token items were constructed analogously to those in 
Fig. 3. Distribution of the responses to the “sense” question in Experiment 1.  
Table 1 
Descriptive statistics for assertability data from Experiment 1.    
Token  Type    
Unconnected Connected Unconnected Connected 
And mean 6.12  5.77  5.78  5.62  
sd 1.28  1.56  1.40  1.57  
If mean 2.84  5.41  2.31  5.53  
sd 1.83  1.77  1.67  1.47   
Table 2 
Fixed effects of model for Experiment 1  
Effect df χ2  p 
Clause Content 1  1.58  .21  
Connection 1  11.59  < .001*  
Sentence 1  11.91  < .001*  
Clause Content*Connection  1  1.84  .18  
Clause Content*Sentence  1  .02  .89  
Connection*Sentence  1  87.09  < .001*  
Clause Content*Connection*Sentence  1  .62  .43   
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Experiment 1: the clauses of the test sentences involved a noun phrase 
with a demonstrative, e.g., “this smartphone,” while the accompanying 
pictures provided the referents. The picture was preceded by the in-
struction: “Please look at the picture and answer the question below.” 
Unlike in Experiment 1, the sentences were not embedded in a conver-
sational context, but, instead, the sentences were presented on their own 
(Type) or accompanied only by a picture (Token). See Fig. 5 for an 
example of a vignette in the Token-And-Connected condition of Exper-
iment 2.8 
Since we did not observe any difference in the pattern of responses to 
the two measures we used in Experiment 1, in this experiment we only 
asked about the naturalness of assertion. That is, the participants were 
asked to answer the following question: 
Assertability: 
“To what extent would it be natural to assert the following sentence: 
…” 
Methods 
Participants. 482 individuals participated in the online survey posted 
on the MTurk platform (https://www.mturk.com/). We removed 4 
participants whose first (native) language was not English. Of the 
remaining 478 participants, 243 were female and one was agender. The 
mean age of the participants was 37.71. All participants received a small 
remuneration for their time and effort. 
Materials and procedure. After giving informed consent, each partic-
ipant was randomly assigned to a condition. Participants in each con-
dition were presented with 16 blocks, one at a time. The order of 
presentation was randomised. Each block contained one question about 
the assertability of a sentence. The participants were asked to mark their 
responses on the 7-point Likert scale, from “Very unnatural” to “Very 
natural.” 
Results 
Before outlining the data, we note that, on average, participants 
classed 95.30% (SD = 7%) of clauses as true, a proportion we consider 
high enough to class our items as TT conditionals, conjunctions, and 
disjunctions.9 Table 3 reports summary statistics, averaged across items. 
As with Experiment 1, “And” and “If” sentences show similar ratings, 
where there is an inferential connection, but “And” sentences show 
higher ratings than “If,” where there is no inferential connection. “Or” 
sentences show low ratings across the board. This pattern suggests an 
interaction between Connection and Sentence, but no clear effect of 
Fig. 4. Estimated marginal means for the assertability data from Experiment 1. The figure shows the interaction of Connection and Sentence.  
8 The photograph of the shark belongs to the public domain. Source: Wiki-
media Commons, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Carcharodon_car 
charias.jpg [retrieved on July 11, 2017]. 
9 Note that we did not use the manipulation check to exclude any items or 
participants. 
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Clause Content. 
The analysis comprised a mixed-effects model on ratings of assert-
ability. The model included main effects of Clause Content (Type/ 
Token) × Connection (Unconnected/Connected) × Sentence (And/Or/ 
If), all two-way interactions, and the three-way interaction. As in 
Experiment 1, we attempted to fit the full random-effects structure 
justified by the design, hence one allowing the interaction terms and 
main effects to vary across items, and including the random intercepts of 
items and participants. But because of convergence problems the final 
model included only the random intercepts of items and participants. 
Here and throughout, the model was fit with the maximum-likelihood 
method, significance being determined with likelihood-ratio tests 
against reduced models. When interactions were significant, there was 
follow-up analysis with tests on the estimated marginal means. Table 4 
summarizes the results. 
Fig. 6 shows the estimated marginal means for all conditions. We 
start by noting that sentences were rated significantly more assertable 
with an inferential connection (M = 4.44, 95% CI [4.20, 4.69]) than 
without (M = 3.56, 95% CI [3.31,3.80]). We turn to Research Question 
1, for completeness also reporting data for “Or” sentences. We see that 
the type of sentence significantly influenced ratings: “And” sentences 
were given the highest ratings (M = 5.03, 95% CI [4.77, 5.29]), then 
Fig. 5. An example of a vignette used in Experiment 2. The item belongs to the And-Token-Connected condition.  
Table 3 
The summary of the descriptive statistics for Experiment 2, averaged across 
items    
Token  Type    
Unconnected Connected Unconnected Connected 
And mean 5.18  5.16  4.88  4.90  
sd 1.79  1.83  1.72  1.74  
Or mean 2.42  2.34  2.71  3.00  
sd 1.49  1.53  1.58  1.81  
If mean 3.48  5.58  2.67  5.67  
sd 1.88  1.51 1.56  1.55   
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“If” sentences (M = 4.35, 95% CI [4.09,4.61]), and lastly “Or” senten-
ces (M = 2.62, 95% CI [2.36,2.88]). However, this effect was qualified 
by an interaction of Sentence and Connection. 
We followed up this interaction with comparisons on the estimated 
marginal means, averaging over the third variable, as shown in Fig. 7. As 
we also followed up two further two-way interactions (reported below), 
we treated all follow-up analyses as a family of 9 tests10 and applied a 
significance level of p = .006. We start by looking at the differences 
between sentence types for sentences with and without an inferential 
connection. These differences provide further detail on Research Ques-
tion 1. Again we report analyses on the “Or” sentences for completeness. 
Table 5 summarizes the relevant (Tukey-corrected) comparisons. 
When there was no connection, “And” sentences were rated highest and 
significantly and substantially more assertable than “If” sentences and 
“Or” sentences. Next highest were “If” sentences, which were also 
significantly more assertable than “Or” sentences. When there was a 
connection, “If” sentences received the highest ratings. “If” sentences 
were rated slightly but significantly more assertable than “And” sen-
tences, and substantially and significantly more assertable than “Or” 
sentences. “And” sentences were rated significantly more assertable 
than “Or” sentences. 
For Research Question 2, we see that inferential connections clearly 
benefited “If” sentences, with these sentences rated substantially and 
significantly higher with a connection than without (MDifference = 2.55,
SE = .16, z = 16.30, p < .001). Moreover, “If” sentences with an 
inferential connection received assertability ratings comfortably above 
the midpoint of the scale, as shown by the estimated marginal mean 
(M = 5.62, 95% CI [5.32, 5.93]). For Research Question 3, we see that 
inferential connections did not benefit sentence types equally, since 
“And” sentences showed essentially no change in assertability according 
to the presence of a connection (MDifference = .001, SE = .16, z = .007,
p = .99). “Or” sentences were rated slightly but non-significantly more 
assertable with a connection (MDifference = .10, SE = .16, z = .65, p =
.51). 
Turning to Research Question 4 we see the following. Token sentences 
(M = 4.03, 95% CI [3.78, 4.27]) were rated slightly and non- 
significantly higher than Type sentences (M = 3.97, 95% CI [3.73,
4.22]). However, the Clause Content variable (Type, Token) entered into 
significant interactions. Take, first, the interaction of Clause Content and 
Connection shown in Fig. 8. Sentences were rated significantly more 
assertable with a connection than without, but this effect was rather 
larger for Type sentences (MDifference = 1.11, SE = .13, z = 8.59,
p < .001) than for Token sentences (MDifference = .66, SE = .13, z =
5.15, p < .001). 
Take, next, the interaction of Clause Content and Sentence as shown 
in Fig. 9. This interaction resulted from including the “Or” sentences in 
the design. Sentence types maintained their order across the levels of 
Content, but note the narrowing of the gap between, on the one hand, 
“And” and “If” and, on the other hand, “Or.” “Or” sentences received 
higher ratings with Type than Token. Table 6 shows the Tukey-corrected 
comparisons. 
Discussion 
Experiment 2 replicated the key findings from Experiment 1. The 
data once again suggested that TT conditionals need not be less 
Table 4 
Fixed effects of model for Experiment 2  
Effect df χ2  p 
Clause Content 1  .34  .56  
Connection 1  86.03  < .001*  
Sentence 2  336.85  < .001*  
Clause Content*Connection  1  5.88  .02*  
Clause Content*Sentence  2  16.33  < .001*  
Connection*Sentence  2  144.64  < .001*  
Clause Content*Connection*Sentence  2  3.82  .15   
Fig. 6. Estimated marginal means for all conditions in Experiment 2.  
10 2 tests for Connection * Clause Content, 2 (after Tukey correction) tests for 
Sentence * Clause Content, 3 for Connection * Sentence from the point of view 
of Connection, and 2 (after Tukey correction) from the point of view of 
Sentence. 
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assertable than corresponding conjunctions (Research Question 1). When 
there was an inferential connection, conditionals and conjunctions again 
received similar ratings, with conditionals rated comfortably above the 
midpoint of the scale. The inferential connection had a clear effect with 
conditionals (Research Question 2), but the effect did not extend to 
conjunctions or disjunctions (Research Question 3). This time, however, 
the data suggested an effect of content expressed by the clauses 
(Research Question 4). Inferential connections had more of an effect with 
type sentences than token sentences. And there was an interaction be-
tween the content of the clauses (Type vs. Token) and the type of sen-
tence (“If” vs. “And” vs. “Or”). This latter interaction was driven by the 
“Or” sentences, which received higher ratings in type sentences than in 
token sentences. 
It bears emphasis that, in Experiment 2, we have found that condi-
tionals and materially equivalent disjunctions had different patterns of 
assertability. Indeed, the disjunctions were generally rated very poorly, 
both in the Connected and Unconnected conditions. These low ratings 
are not surprising given that constructively justified disjunctions, that is, 
disjunctions inferred from the truth of one of the disjuncts, tend to be 
infelicitous. A speaker who says “p or q” when they know that q is 
terribly unhelpful; they violate the (first) Maxim of Quantity, “Make 
your contribution as informative as is required (for the current purposes 
of the exchange)” (Grice, 1989, p. 26). Unlike in the case of conditionals 
then, here the standard Gricean explanation does the job: asserting a 
true disjunct means making a stronger claim than asserting a 
disjunction, be it in the Connected or Unconnected case. Note also that 
the inference from p to “p or q” is actually invalid in some systems that 
have been recently very influential in psychology, such as Coherence 
Based Probability Logic (Gilio and Over, 2012) or the Mental Models 
Theory (Johnson-Laird et al., 2015). 
Our disjunctions may also have been infelicitous because of the truth 
values of the disjuncts. One disjunct—the consequent of the corre-
sponding conditional —was known to be true. The other—the negated 
antecedent of the corresponding conditional—was known to be false. 
We also constructed our materials using clauses that were supposed to 
be known to the speaker and that could be assumed to be common 
knowledge. It is hard to imagine a context in which it would be felicitous 
to assert such a disjunction at all. 
It makes sense, then, that our disjunctions were not assertable, but 
their unassertability does not undermine two key points. Firstly, dis-
junctions (even with low assertability) could have benefited from an 
inferential connection and did not. Secondly, disjunctions reacted 
differently to the Clause Content manipulation.11 Disjunctions were 
given higher assertability ratings in Type than Token sentences, the 
opposite trend from that seen with conjunctions and conditionals. 
A final point concerns the lack of conversational contexts. Experi-
ment 2 dropped the conversational contexts used in Experiment 1, 
having participants instead rate the assertability of sentences in isola-
tion. This design change reduces the chance that our effects arose from 
specific conversational contexts. The design still leaves open the possi-
bility that the effect of the connection originated in more general 
conversational pragmatics. But if our findings are taken in connection 
with philosophical and empirical literature on assertion, they make a 
pragmatic explanation less plausible. The literature on assertion sug-
gests a number of factors that contribute to whether a sentence can be 
asserted—i.e. the constitutive rules of assertion. The most important of 
these factors are epistemic in nature, such as the speaker’s knowledge 
Fig. 7. Estimated marginal means for interaction of Connection and Sentence in Experiment 2.  
Table 5 
Tukey-corrected comparisons for interaction of Connection and Sentence Type 
in Experiment 2.  
Connection Contrast MDifference  SE z p 
Unconnected And > Or  2.47  .16  15.50  < .001*  
And > If  1.96  .16  12.55  < .001*  
If > Or  .51  .16  3.20  .004*  
Connected And > Or  2.36  .16  14.93  < .001*  
And < If  .59  .16  3.79  < .001*  
If > Or  2.95  .16  18.64  < .001*   
11 This is not to say that the Clause Content manipulation only affected dis-
junctions. Note the significant two-way of interaction of Clause Content and 
Connection: inferential connections had a bigger effect with Type than Token 
sentences, averaged over the levels of the Sentence variable (“If,” “And,” “Or”). 
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that what they assert is the case (e.g. Williamson, 1996; DeRose, 2002; 
Pagin, 2011), the truth of the given sentence (e.g. Turri, 2013), or its 
rational credibility (e.g. Douven, 2006). We argue that, without clear 
pragmatic cues, participants judge a sentence’s assertability based on its 
content. That being the case, we interpret Experiment 2 as providing 
indirect evidence that the connection might not be a merely pragmatic 
phenomenon. Naturally, such evidence is never ultimately conclusive, 
and we cannot rule out the possibility that the connection can be 
modelled pragmatically in a way that would be consistent with our 
findings as well as other related studies (see the General Discussion). 
Our results, nevertheless, hint at the possibility that the connection 
belongs to the literal, conventional meaning of the conditional, its se-
mantics, but not to the literal, conventional meaning of conjunctions and 
disjunctions. We will explore this possibility later in the paper. 
Experiment 3 
We have suggested that Experiments 1 and 2 can be taken as evi-
dence, however indirect and, admittedly, on its own inconclusive, that 
the connection between a conditional’s antecedent and its consequent is 
Fig. 8. Estimated marginal means for Connection and Content in Experiment 2.  
Fig. 9. Estimated marginal means for Content and Sentence in Experiment 2.  
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not merely a product of conversational pragmatics. The connection 
certainly does not seem to arise as a conversational implicature in the 
way described in the famous passage by Grice. If it did, we would have 
observed conditionals being judged unassertable when a speaker is 
warranted in asserting a conjunction of their antecedents and conse-
quents. Since we have eliminated contextual differences across condi-
tions, it is plausible that what has affected participants’ assertability 
judgments is due to semantic content of the test sentences. After all, 
while pragmatics does often play a role, whether a sentence is assertable 
hinges upon its truth value or on the evidence a speaker has to justify 
that it is true, to wit, the semantic aspects of that sentence, and the 
speaker’s epistemic stance towards its content. 
Yet a critic could object that participants in our studies were asked to 
judge the extent to which the test sentences were natural to assert, so our 
data can only be interpreted as showing what makes a sentence a good 
thing to say, without establishing anything about its semantic meaning. 
We remind the reader, however, that we also asked whether the sen-
tences “made sense,” with virtually identical results, so that it seems 
unlikely that our dependent variable taps only into “pragmatics” as 
standardly conceived. Nevertheless, we sought to provide further evi-
dence to this effect by eliciting judgments from participants that were 
tied explicitly to truth. We avoided using truth value judgments as our 
dependent variable directly, because it is a vexed question—one beyond 
the scope of this paper—whether conditionals can be true or false at 
all.12 Instead, we asked participants to indicate the extent to which they 
agreed with the sentences presented to them. We did, however, explic-
itly instruct participants that they should consider truth or falsity of 
given sentences when forming their judgments. These are the specific 
instructions they received: 
In this study, you will be asked to read a number of sentences. Your 
task will be to evaluate to what extent you agree with these sen-
tences. Think of it this way: you might want to strongly agree with a 
sentence when, in your opinion, what the sentence states is certainly 
the case or, to put it differently, definitely true. If you think that what 
the sentence states is certainly false, you might want to strongly 
disagree with it. Please read the sentences and the questions 
carefully. 
Once again, the sentences were not embedded in conversational 
contexts but presented to participants in isolation or, for Token items, 
accompanied by a picture. Fig. 10 shows an example item used in this 
experiment. 
Apart from using a different measure, we introduced the following 
changes to the design of the Experiment 3 as compared to that of the 
Experiment 2. First, since disjunctions were unassertable in all condi-
tions and as such did not contribute to the current debate at all, we 
excluded them from this study. Furthermore, given that the control 
questions of the Experiment 2 allowed us to establish that the clauses of 
the test sentences are known to participants to be true, and making the 
survey longer than necessary raises methodological concerns (i.e. 
participants may get tired or bored with the survey, and, consequently, 
read the questions in an careless manner), here the main survey was not 
followed by a manipulation check. 
Finally, due to the fact that the design of both Experiment 1 and 2 
was completely between participants, each individual saw sentences 
belonging to just one condition. Consequently, they saw series of vi-
gnettes asking them to evaluate sentences which might have been all 
equally natural to say, or equally strange. Hence, participants might 
have become used to the weirdness of some of the test sentences, and 
evaluated them as more assertable than they would have otherwise. At 
the same time, participants might have increased their ratings for some 
unassertable sentences or decreased them for some assertable sentences 
just to introduce some variance to their responses. For this reason, for 
Experiment 3, we designed a set of filler items to create natural variation 
and conceal from participants the factors that we were interested in. The 
ratio of filler items to test items was 2 to 1, that is, next to the 16 test 
items, each participant saw 32 filler items. The filler items were similar 
to the test items in the following respect: they were complex sentences 
that were built using the same clauses as the test items, such as “roses 
have thorns” or “smartphones can be used to make phone calls.” Half of 
the filler items were knowledge ascriptions, such as “Barack Obama 
knows that roses have thorns,” and the other half were sentences with 
relative clauses, e.g.. “Smartphones, which can be used to make phone 
calls, are popular.”. 
Method 
Participants. 323 participants completed the online survey posted on 
the MTurk platform (https://www.mturk.com/). We removed 7 partic-
ipants who were not native English speakers. Of the remaining partici-
pants, 145 were women and 1 indicated other gender. The average age 
of the participants was 37.97. All participants received a small remu-
neration for their time and effort. 
Materials and procedure. After giving informed consent, each partic-
ipant was randomly assigned to a condition. After the introductory 
block, the demographic questions, and a block explaining the task, 
participants in each condition were presented with 48 blocks with test 
questions and filler items, one at a time. The order of presentation was 
randomised. Each block asked to what extent participants agree with a 
given sentence. The participants were asked to mark their responses on 
the 7-point Likert scale, from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree.” 
Results 
Table 7 reports summary statistics, averaged across items. The data 
suggest a similar pattern to Experiments 1 and 2. Where there is a 
connection, conjunctions and conditionals have similar ratings—this 
time of agreement. But where there is no connection, conjunctions have 
higher ratings than conditionals. This pattern suggests an interaction 
between Connection and Sentence. There is no clear sign of an effect of 
Clause Content (Type vs. Token). 
The analysis followed the same template as for Experiment 2, 
comprising a mixed-effects model on ratings of agreement. The model 
included main effects of Clause Content (Type/Token) × Connection 
(Unconnected/Connected) × Sentence (And/If), all two-way in-
teractions, and the three-way interaction. As in Experiment 2, the 
maximal converging model included only random intercepts by item 
and participant. Table 8 summarizes the results. 
Fig. 11 shows the estimated marginal means by condition. We start 
by noting that sentences received significantly higher agreement ratings 
when they had a connection (M = 6.43, 95% CI [6.22,6.63]) than when 
they did not (M = 5.23, 95% CI [5.02, 5.44]). Turning to Research 
Question 1 we see that “And” sentences received significantly higher 
agreement ratings (M = 6.53, 95% CI [6.33,6.74]) than “If” sentences 
(M = 5.12, 95% CI [4.91, 5.33]). But this effect was qualified by the 
significant interaction between Connection and Sentence. 
Table 6 
Caption Tukey-corrected comparisons for interaction of Clause Content Type 
and Sentence Type in Experiment 2.  
Clause Content Contrast MDifference  SE z p 
Token And > Or  2.79  .16  17.58  < .001*  
And > If  .64  .16  4.09  < .001*  
If > Or  2.15  .16  13.54  < .001*  
Type And > Or  2.04  .16  12.85  < .001*  
And > If  .72  .16  4.62  .001*  
If > Or  1.31  .16  8.29  < .001*   
12 See, e.g., Bennett (2003) for a discussion. 
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The interaction of Connection and Sentence was explored with 
comparisons on the estimated marginal means averaging over the levels 
of Clause Content. These comparisons were treated as a family of 4 tests, 
and accordingly used a significance level of p = .013. When there was 
no inferential connection, “And” sentences received substantially and 
significantly higher agreement ratings than “If” sentences (MDifference =
2.58, SE = .12, z = 21.71, p < .001). But when there was a 
connection, “And” sentences received only slightly and non-significantly 
higher ratings (MDifference = .25, SE = .17, z = 2.13, p = .03). The 
parameter estimate for this difference and its standard error suggested 
that our data are compatible with small differences between sentence 
types. 
Turning to Research Question 2, we see that “If” sentences received 
substantially and significantly higher agreement ratings with a 
connection than without (MDifference = 2.36, SE = .12, z = 20.16,
p < .001). Moreover, “If” sentences with an inferential connection 
received agreement ratings comfortably above the midpoint of the scale, 
as shown by the estimated marginal mean (M = 6.30, 95% CI [6.07,
6.54]). Turning to Research Question 3, we see that inferential connec-
tions did not benefit sentences equally, since “And” sentences received 
only very slightly, and non-significantly, higher agreement ratings with 
a connection than without (MDifference = .03, SE = .18, z = .28, p =
.78). 
Turning to Research Question 4 we see no clear evidence for an effect 
of the content expressed by the clauses. Type sentences received slightly 
and non-significantly higher agreement ratings (M = 5.89, 95% CI [5.
68, 6.10]) than token sentences (M = 5.76, 95% CI [5.55, 5.97]). The 
Clause Content variable did not enter into significant interactions. 
Discussion 
Experiment 3 replicated the answers to three out of four research 
questions with a new dependent variable, ratings of agreement. TT 
conjunctions did not uniformly receive higher agreement ratings than 
corresponding conditionals (Research Question 1). Conjunctions only 
received reliably higher agreement ratings than corresponding condi-
tionals when there was no inferential connection. When there was a 
connection, conjunctions and conditionals attracted similar agreement 
ratings. Inferential connections led to higher ratings with conditionals, 
which were again rated comfortably above the midpoint of the scale 
(Research Question 2). And as in Experiments 1 and 2, inferential con-
nections did not benefit sentence types equally: inferential connections 
did not benefit conjunctions (Research Question 3). However, there was 
no clear effect of Clause Content (Type vs. Token; Research Question 4). 
There was no interaction between Clause Content and Sentence, which 
can be explained by Experiment 3 dropping the “Or” sentences that 
drove this interaction. But there was no interaction of Content and 
Connection, nor was there a similar trend in Experiment 3 (or, indeed, 
Experiment 1). That interaction, then, does not look reliable. 
This experiment has added useful data over Experiments 1 and 2. 
Experiments 1 and 2 showed that a conditional with a true antecedent 
and true consequent does not have to be a strange thing to say. These 
experiments, then, contradicted a prediction derived from the Gricean 
account of conversational pragmatics. Conditionals with true clauses 
had similar assertability to corresponding conjunctions as long as their 
clauses had meaningful inferential connections. A sentence might be 
unassertable for different reasons, only one of them being a violation of 
some pragmatic rules, such as the maxims of the Cooperative Principle. 
Another reason is the content of that sentence: a false sentence, or a 
Fig. 10. An example of a vignette used in Experiment 3. The item belongs to the If-Type-Connected condition.  
Table 7 
Descriptive statistics for the data from Experiment 3, averaged across items.    
Token  Type    
Unconnected Connected Unconnected Connected 
And mean 6.46  6.53  6.57  6.57  
sd .93  .96  .82  .96  
If mean 3.85  6.21  4.03  6.39  
sd 1.96  1.21  1.86  1.09   
Table 8 
Fixed effects for Experiment 3.  
Effect df χ2  p 
Clause Content 1  2.36  .13  
Connection 1  159.43  < .001*  
Sentence 1  204.96  < .001*  
Clause Content*Connection  1  .05  .83  
Clause Content*Sentence  1  .38  .54  
Connection*Sentence  1  152.61  < .001*  
Clause Content*Connection*Sentence  1  .05  .82   
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sentence for which a speaker lacks appropriate justification, might be 
deemed a strange thing to say, too (Pagin, 2016). By directly probing the 
participants’ epistemic attitude towards conditionals and conjunctions 
used in Experiment 2, Experiment 3 provides an additional piece of 
evidence against the first option and, indirectly, for the second option. 
Experiment 4 
Experiments 1, 2, and 3 show that TT conditionals are neither less 
assertable, less acceptable, nor do they make less sense than the con-
junctions of their antecedents and consequents when there is a 
connection between these clauses. However, an anonymous reviewer 
pointed out that the pattern of responses that we have found might have 
been due to a contribution of “then” which has been present in all 
conditionals in our experimental materials, in all three experiments. 
Most theories of conditionals in philosophy and in the psychology of 
reasoning do not seem to make a distinction between “If p, qp, q” and “If 
p, then q,” although Grice suggested that the two types of conditional 
might have different meanings. However, linguists have proposed that 
the semantics of “then” make an important and relevnat contribution to 
the meaning of the conditional. Iatridou (1994) has famously proposed 
that “then” carries a presupposition that at least in some cases in which 
the antecedent is false, so is the consequent. Relatedly, von Fintel (1994) 
analysed “then” as carrying a conventional implicature which conveys 
that if the antecedent were not true, the consequent would not be true 
either. 
Both proposals are able to explain some linguists’ intuitions that, 
while (8a) and (8b) appear equivalent, there is supposedly a clear 
distinction between (9a) and (9b): 
(8) a. If Anna ate the biscuits, she was hungry. 
b. If Anna ate the biscuits, then she was hungry. 
(9) a. If you are hungry, there are biscuits in the cupboard. 
b. #If you are hungry, then there are biscuits in the cupboard. 
On these intuitions, adding “then” to the consequent of a biscuit 
conditional renders the sentence infelicitous (e.g. Bhatt & Pancheva, 
2006). Similarly, “then” seems to be unavailable in non-interference 
conditionals: 
(10) a. Even if Anna was hungry, she didn’t eat the biscuits. 
b. #Even if Anna was hungry, then she didn’t eat the biscuits. 
What (9b) and (10b) seem to have in common is their factual 
consequent, hence the presupposition that at least some not-p cases are 
not-q cases fails. More recently, Biezma (2014) proposed an analysis of 
“then” as a discourse marker which requires that the antecedent is a 
reason for, or a causal explanation of, the consequent. This requirement 
is not satisfied in sentences such as (9b) or (10b). 
This analysis has not, to the best of our knowledge, been supported 
by any actual experimental or corpus-based evidence. In fact, an 
experiment by Skovgaard-Olsen (2019) showed that the effect of rele-
vance on the probability judgments of conditionals does not depend on 
the presence of the particle “then” in the consequent, already under-
mining the above discussed proposal.13 Nevertheless, let us consider the 
hypothesis that the presence of the particle “then” in our materials is the 
driving force behind the effect of connection we have found in our ex-
periments, which would be an important limitation to our results. 
If this were indeed the case, we should not observe for conditionals 
without “then” the same pattern of responses that we have established in 
experiments 1–3. We consider two possibilities, here, on which our re-
sults may fail to generalise. Firstly, the Gricean account may truly apply 
only to conditionals without “then”: hence, they should be rated uni-
formly worse than corresponding conjunctions. Secondly, conditionals 
with “then” are peculiar in requiring a connection; conditionals without 
“then” may therefore be uniformly acceptable and not reliably different 
from conjunctions. 
To address the reviewer’s concerns, we conducted a fourth experi-
ment which followed the design of Experiment 3 except that it compared 
three types of sentences: conditionals with “then,” corresponding con-
ditionals without “then,” and conjunctions of their antecedents and 
consequents. As in the preceding experiments, we have additionally 
manipulated the type of content expressed by the clauses of the test 
sentences, and the presence of an inferential connection between them. 
Our test hence followed a 3 × 2 × 2 between-participants factorial 
design with sentence type (conditionals without “then” vs. conditionals 
Fig. 11. Estimated marginal means for Experiment 3.  
13 We are grateful to an anonymous Reviewer for this journal for bringing this 
to our attention. 
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with “then” vs. conjunctions, denoted by “If,” “If_then,” and “And,” 
respectively), content type (generic, “Type,” vs. specific, “Token”) and 
the inferential connection (Connected vs. Unconnected). We have also 
used the same materials as in experiments 1–3. The following sentences 
are example test items belonging to Unconnected Type condition:   
If If roses are plants, they have thorns. 
If_the-
n If 
roses are plants, then they have thorns.  
And Roses are plants, and they have thorns. 
Unlike in the previous experiments, we used anaphoric constructions 
in the consequents (or the second conjunct, in the case of conjunctions), 
instead of repeating the noun phrase from the antecedent (or the first 
conjunct; e.g. “If roses are plants, roses need water”), so the items 
sounded more natural. Repeating the subject noun phrase seemed to 
make some of our items sound less natural, particularly when the dis-
tance between the first occurrence of the phrase and its repetition is 
short, hence it particularly affected many of our conditionals without 
“then.” To avoid the repetition acting as a confounding variable, we 
rephrased all our type items using anaphoric constructions. The token 
items were exactly as before. As in Experiment 3, we asked participants 
for their agreement ratings. However, we omitted the filler items. Their 
presence in Experiment 3 did not affect the pattern of responses that we 
established in Experiments 1 and 2, but it made the survey three times 
longer and potentially more tiresome for the participants.14 
Note that this experiment allows us to replicate Experiment 3 while 
investigating slightly modified versions of the four key research ques-
tions, repeated here for convenience: (1) Are TT conditionals—including 
conditionals without “then”—given lower ratings than their corre-
sponding conjunctions? (2) Does an inferential connection between 
antecedent and content benefit conditionals with and without “then,” 
and how acceptable are they? (3) Is there any clear difference across the 
three sentence types—but in particular, between the types of con-
ditional—in how much inferential connections benefit improve ratings? 
And (4) Do ratings of conditionals of either sort depend on whether they 
concern types or tokens? 
Method 
Participants. 481 participants completed the online survey via the 
MTurk platform (https://www.mturk.com/). We removed one partici-
pant who answered “No” to a sincerity question, and a further 6 par-
ticipants who indicated that they were neither native English speakers 
nor bilingual from birth. Of the remaining participants, 238 identified as 
women and 2 identified as non-binary. Excluding one participant who 
did not supply their age, the average age of the participants was 37.69. 
All participants received a small remuneration for their time and effort. 
Materials and procedure. After giving informed consent, each partic-
ipant was randomly assigned to a condition. After the introductory block 
explaining participants’ rights and the data protection regulations, and a 
block explaining the task, participants in each condition were presented 
with 16 blocks with test questions, one at a time. The order of presen-
tation was randomised. Each block asked to what extent participants 
agree with a given sentence. The participants were asked to mark their 
responses on the 7-point Likert scale, from “strongly disagree” to 
“strongly agree.” 
Results 
Table 9 summarizes the data, averaged across items. Notably, “And” 
sentences receive similar ratings in all conditions. When both “If” and 
“If_then” sentences also have an inferential connection, they receive 
similar ratings to “And” sentences. But when they lack a connection, 
they receive considerably lower ratings. This pattern hints at an inter-
action of sentence type and connection, and suggests that the effect of an 
inferential connection is not limited to “If_then” sentences. This inter-
action appears similar for both type and token sentences. 
The analysis followed the same template as for Experiments 2 and 3, 
comprising a mixed-effects model on ratings of agreement. The model 
included main effects of Clause Content (Type/Token) × Connection 
(Unconnected/Connected) × Sentence (And/If/ If_then), all two-way 
interactions, and the three-way interaction. As in previous experi-
ments, the maximal converging model included only random intercepts 
by item and participant, and not the full random-effects structure 
justified by the design. Table 10 reports the fixed effects. 
Fig. 12 shows the estimated marginal means for each condition. 
Firstly we note that there was a significant main effect of Connection, 
with connected sentences (M = 6.33, 95% CI [6.12, 6.54]) receiving 
significantly higher ratings than unconnected sentences (M = 5.04, 95% 
CI [4.83,5.25]). Turning to Research Question 1, we see a significant ef-
fect of Sentence Type, with “And” sentences receiving the highest ratings 
(M = 6.48, 95% CI [6.26, 6.71]), then “If” sentences (M = 5.36, 95% 
CI [5.13,5.59]), and finally “If_then” sentences (M = 5.21, 95% CI [4.
98, 5.44]). However, these effects were qualified by significant in-
teractions of Clause Content and Sentence, Connection and Sentence, 
and the three-way interaction. 
To address Research Questions 1 and 2, we must address the three-way 
interaction and consider, in particular, how the interaction between 
Connection and Sentence changes depending on the level of Clause 
Content. 
We compared sentence types for each combination of content type 
and connection. The results are shown in Table 11 with a Holm 
adjustment for a family of 12 tests. As Fig. 12 suggests, for both Type and 
Token sentences, when there was a connection, “And,” “If,” and 
“If_then” sentences did not differ significantly from each other. Again for 
both Type and Token sentences, when there was no connection, “And” 
sentences were rated significantly higher than both “If” and “If_then” 
sentences. But as Fig. 12 also suggests, there was more differentiation 
between “If” and “If_then” sentences. For Token sentences without a 
connection, “If” sentences were rated significantly higher than “If_then” 
sentences. For Type sentences, there was a small but non-significant 
Table 9 
Descriptive statistics for the data from Experiment 4, averaged across items.    
Token  Type    
Unconnected Connected Unconnected Connected 
And mean 6.32  6.51  6.64  6.47  
sd 1.03  1.07  .79  .95  
If mean 4.77  6.29  4.18  6.20  
sd 1.94  1.18  2.12  1.19  
If_then mean 3.98  6.30  4.36  6.20  
sd 2.03  1.22  2.03  1.33   
Table 10 
Fixed effects for Experiment 4.  
Effect df χ2  p 
Clause Content 1  .08  .78  
Connection 1  192.86  < .001*  
Sentence 2  158.37  < .001*  
Clause Content*Connection  1  .46  .50  
Clause Content*Sentence  2  7.39  .03  
Connection*Sentence  2  107.90  < .001*  
Clause Content*Connection*Sentence  2  6.72  .04   
14 This decision was additionally affected by budgetary limitations. 
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difference in the opposite direction. We return to this point below. 
Turning to Research Question 2, we ran comparisons on the estimated 
marginal means, comparing connected and unconnected sentences for 
each combination of sentence type and content. The results are shown in 
Table 12. Note that a Holm adjustment was applied for a family of 6 
tests. A connection significantly improved ratings for both “If” and 
“If_then” sentences. “If” sentences with a connection received ratings 
comfortably above the midpoint of the scale for both Type sentences 
(M = 6.20, 95% CI [5.87,6.53]) and Token sentences (M = 6.29, 95% 
CI [5.96,6.62]). “If_then” sentences with a connection likewise received 
ratings comfortably above the midpoint of the scale for both Type sen-
tences (M = 6.20, 95% CI [5.87,6.53]) and Token sentences (M = 6.30, 
95% CI [5.96,6.64]). 
Turning to Research Question 3, we see that a connection did not 
benefit sentence types equally, since a connection did not significantly 
improve ratings for “And” sentences. The standard error indicates that 
“And” sentences were consistent with small effects of a connection, both 
positive and negative. 
Turning to Research Question 4, we note evidence that there was a 
non-significant main effect of Clause Content, with token sentences 
(M = 5.70, 95% CI [5.48, 5.91]) and type sentences (M = 5.67, 95% 
CI [5.46,5.88]) receiving very similar ratings. However, Clause Content 
is implicated in the two-way interaction of Clause Content and Sentence 
Fig. 12. Estimated marginal means for Experiment 4.  
Table 11 
Holm-corrected comparisons of sentence types in Experiment 4.  
Content Sentence Contrast MDifference  SE z p 
Token Unconnected And – If 1.55  0.21  7.48  < .001*  
And – 
If_Then 
2.33  0.21  11.20  < .001*  
If – If_Then 0.78  0.21  3.75  0.001*  
Connected And – If 0.22  0.20  1.08  1.00  
And – 
If_Then 
0.21  .21  1.00  1.00  
If – If_Then − 0.01  0.20  − 0.06  1.00  
Type Unconnected And – If 2.46  0.20  12.06  < .001*  
And – 
If_Then 
2.28  0.20  11.19  < .001*  
If – If_Then − 0.18  0.21  − 0.86  1.00  
Connected And – If 0.27  0.20  1.37  1.00  
And – 
If_Then 
0.27  0.20  1.34  1.00  
If – If_Then − 0.005  0.20  − 0.02  1.00   
Table 12 
Holm-corrected comparisons of connected and unconnected sentences in 
Experiment 4. The mean difference is “Connected–Unconnected”: hence a pos-
itive number means connected sentences were rated higher.  
Content Sentence MDifference  SE z p 
Token And 0.20  0.20  0.94  0.69  
If 1.52  0.20  7.45  < .001*  
If_Then 2.32  0.21  11.06  < .001*  
Type And − 0.17  0.20  − 0.88  0.69  
If 2.02  0.20  9.89  < .001*  
If_Then 1.85  0.21  8.98  < .001*   
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type and the three-way interaction. The role of Clause Content here 
appears to be driven by the effect identified above: that there is a sig-
nificant difference between “If” and “If_then” sentences only for token 
sentences. 
Discussion 
Experiment 4 addressed the possibility, raised by our reviewers, that 
our findings have limited generality because of the presence of “then” in 
our conditionals. We considered the possibility that the Gricean account 
is limited to conditionals without “then” and the possibility that the 
effect of inferential connections is different for conditionals with and 
without “then.” In fact, Experiment 4 replicated the key findings of 
Experiments 1–3. In particular, we found that TT conjunctions did not 
uniformly receive reliably higher agreement ratings than corresponding 
conditionals, whether with or without “then,” (Research Question 1). 
Rather, when there was a connection, conditionals with and without 
“then” received ratings that were not reliably different from conjunc-
tions. Connections benefited both types of conditionals, which were 
rated comfortably above the midpoint of the scale when there was a 
connection between antecedent and consequent (Research Question 2). 
But as in the previous experiments, connections did not benefit con-
junctions, and there was no clear difference in the extent to which 
connections benefited the two types of conditional (Research Question 3). 
Lastly, as in Experiment 2, there was an interaction between clause 
content (Type vs. Token) and sentence type (“If” vs. “If_then” vs. “And”; 
Research Question 4)—though note that the sentence type variable has 
different levels from Experiment 2. In this case, the interaction seems to 
be driven by a relative difference in ratings for conditionals with “then” 
and those without “then” in the Token-Unconnected condition. Uncon-
nected Token Conditionals without “then” received higher ratings than 
Unconnected Token Conditionals with “then”, although much lower 
than corresponding conjunctions. 
By and large, we have not found any clear, consistent effect of the 
particle “then” on the acceptability of conditionals with true clauses. 
Our results then indicate that the reported effect of the inferential 
connection is unlikely to be driven by the contribution of the particle 
“then” instead of the conditional itself, as the reviewer suggested. In 
fact, already Geis and Lycan (1993) argued that adding “then” to the 
consequent of a conditional does not change its meaning. The received 
view on the semantics of “then” has recently been additionally chal-
lenged by an observation that, contrary to what was put forward by 
Iatridou (1994), and followed up by many others, “then” turns out to be 
felicitous in some biscuit conditionals (Zakkou, 2017). Declerck and 
Reed, 2001 made a similar claim, based on an extensive corpus study of 
conditional constructions in English. Furthermore, our finding is 
consistent with the data reported in Skovgaard-Olsen (2019), who 
showed that the same relevance effect on participants’ probability as-
signments is observed whether the conditional’s consequent was 
phrased with or without “then.” Skovgaard-Olsen notes that the differ-
ence between the two types of conditionals appeared to have been 
treated by participants as a “little more than a stylistic difference” (p. 8). 
The difference between conditionals with and without “then” for 
Token sentences deserves closer attention. It bears further emphasis that 
the two types of conditional are importantly similar: when there is a 
connection, TT conditionals are given similar acceptability ratings to 
corresponding conjunctions, while their acceptability drops substan-
tially when the connection is missing. This data pattern is crucial for our 
purposes. However, it is intriguing that the two types of Token condi-
tional differ when there is no connection. One possible explanation for 
this difference is that “then” emphasises the presence of the connection 
which is, in the Unconnected condition, not there, rendering the con-
ditional even more infelicitous than it is without it. If that is the case, 
however, it is surprising that “then” has no such effect on the accept-
ability of the Type Unconnected conditional. Given that this finding does 
not substantively affect our overall conclusions, we defer an exploration 
of this difference to future research. 
General Discussion 
In this paper, we addressed four research questions. First, we 
investigated whether TT conditionals are less assertable (and less 
acceptable) than conjunctions of their antecedents and consequents, as 
predicted by a Gricean account of the oddity of missing link conditionals 
(Research Question 1), and whether the assertability ratings of condi-
tionals are affected by the presence of a connection between their 
clauses (Research Question 2). Additionally, we tested whether such an 
effect, if found, is specific to conditionals or if it affects other types of 
sentences too (Research Question 3). Finally, we explored the possibility 
that the assertability of a TT conditional depends on the type of content 
expressed by its antecedent and consequent (Research Question 4). 
Contrary to the predictions drawn from Gricean pragmatics, the fact 
that the antecedent and the consequent are both known to be true is not 
sufficient for a conditional to be judged as unassertable. While TT con-
ditionals without a connection indeed received lower assertability rat-
ings than corresponding conjunctions, this was not the case for TT 
conditionals with a meaningful, e.g., causal or inferential, link between 
their antecedents and consequents. Conditionals with a connection were 
judged to be as reasonable things to say, as natural to assert, and as 
acceptable, as corresponding conjunctions. Moreover, we have shown 
that knowing that p and q are both true is not sufficient for “If p, then q” 
to be acceptable, which we replicated for conditionals without “then.” 
The participants’ explicitly epistemic attitudes towards conditionals 
seem to be equally affected by the presence or absence of the connection 
between their clauses. Finally, we demonstrated that the presence of a 
connection, while necessary for a conditional to be assertable and 
acceptable, does not seem to affect participants’ assertability ratings for 
conjunctions and disjunctions in a similar way. It is, then, a unique 
characteristic of conditionals. 
The Clause Content manipulation, however, did not have such a clear 
effect across our experiments. The assertability and acceptability pat-
terns were very similar for generic conditionals and conjunctions to their 
specific counterparts. Our data hinted at a role for this variable in Ex-
periments 2 and 4. In Experiment 2, there was a significant interaction 
between Clause Content and Connection averaged over the Sentence 
variable. But this effect did not show up in Experiments 1, 3 or 4, so has 
questionable reliability. In contrast, there were significant interactions 
between clause content and sentence type in both Experiments 2 and 4, 
though the sentence type variable was implemented with different levels 
in the two experiments, reducing their comparability. In Experiment 2, 
the Clause Content manipulation produced a distinctive pattern for 
disjunctions: Type sentences increased the assertability of disjunctions 
but decreased the assertability of conjunctions and conditionals. This 
finding adds to our evidence that conditionals differ importantly from 
both conjunctions and disjunctions. In Experiment 4, the content 
manipulation was involved in a two-way interaction with sentence type 
and a three-way interaction with sentence type and connection. 
Breaking these effects down, we identified that there was a reliable 
difference between the two types of conditional but only for uncon-
nected sentences that were about tokens. While this effect merits further 
attention, we set it aside for future work. 
Our findings pose a challenge for all theories that treat the connec-
tion between antecedent and consequent as solely a pragmatic aspect of 
its meaning—something conversationally implicated—such as the ma-
terial account, the Mental Models Theory, the possible worlds account, 
or the probabilistic Suppositional Theory15 (in what follows, we will 
limit our discussion to those theories of conditionals that became 
15 Strictly speaking, the latter two accounts might be construed as attempts to 
capture the dependence of a conditional’s consequent on its antecedent, but 
they fail to do that for some cases, such as precisely the case of TT conditionals. 
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important in the context of psychology of reasoning, to wit, Mental 
Models Theory and the Suppositional Theory). On the assumption that 
what a conditional conveys is weaker or less informative than what a 
conjunction conveys, a speaker who knowingly chooses to assert a TT 
conditional instead of the corresponding conjunction, violates the 
Maxim of Quantity. Yet, as our data clearly show, when a connection is 
present, conditionals are as assertable as the conjunctions of their an-
tecedents and consequents. 
An explanation of these findings could follow two different paths: 
One can reject the most fundamental principles of Gricean pragmatics by 
denying that informativeness guides people’s assertability judgements. 
Another, less costly, option is to rethink the assumptions about the se-
mantics of conditionals, and to accept the possibility that the connection 
between antecedents and consequents is an important part of their core 
meaning. On the latter approach, the conditional would not be entailed 
by the conjunction, and, hence, it would not be weaker in the relevant 
sense. Moreover, the connection would be taken as an additional piece 
of information conveyed by a conditional, but not by a conjunction. In 
other words, to keep the Gricean view on pragmatics intact, we need an 
account that allows conditionals to be viewed as (approximately) 
equally informative as conjunctions (on the standard, truth-functional 
interpretation of a conjunction). 
Neither Mental Models nor the Suppositional Theory can follow this 
path, however. On the Mental Models Theory (MMT), for instance, 
compound assertions refer to conjunctions of possibilities, where the 
possibilities are understood in an epistemic sense. These are possible 
states of affairs—situations—that are compatible with the assertion 
(Khemlani et al., 2018). Consequently, the core meaning of a natural 
language conditional, “If p then q,” is a conjunction of: “it is possible that 
p and q,” “it is possible that ¬p and q,” and “it is possible that ¬p and ¬q.” 
A basic conditional is true if all these three situations are possible, and p 
and ¬q is impossible (Johnson-Laird et al., 2015, p. 206). Although a 
conditional on the MMT is not entailed by a conjunction of its clauses, 
the connection between the clauses is not a part of its core meaning 
either. While the proponents of the MMT do not deny that conditionals 
often seem to convey the presence of a relation between their clauses, 
they construe this phenomenon as an effect of the mechanism of a se-
mantic and pragmatic modulation: 
…modulation can establish an indefinite number of different tem-
poral, spatial, and coreferential relations between the antecedent 
and consequent of a conditional. (Johnson-Laird and Byrne, 2002, p. 
660). 
In other words, the content of the clauses (semantic modulation) and 
contextual factors (pragmatic modulation) can influence the interpre-
tation of a conditional. However, the only thing that these mechanisms 
do is constrain (or expand) the set of possibilities a speaker envisages 
when interpreting a sentence. In particular, they come into play when, e. 
g, some of the possibilities belonging to the explicit model cannot co- 
occur. For instance, the content of the clauses “If it rains, then it’ll 
pour” prevents the construction of the model consisting of the possibility 
that it was not raining and the possibility that it was pouring since 
pouring entails raining (Johnson-Laird et al., 2015, p. 206). 
To the best of our knowledge, in the MMT literature, there is no 
explicit discussion of conditionals whose clauses are known to be true, 
and how their models relate to corresponding conjunctions. Neverthe-
less, we conjecture that MMT would predict that the construction of “it is 
possible that ¬p and q,” and “it is possible that ¬p and ¬q” should be 
prevented in such cases, at least due to contextual factors (pragmatic 
modulation). Consequently, the models for TT conditionals and for 
conjunctions of their clauses should be the same, which would explain 
why, when TT conditionals are assertable at all, their assertability rat-
ings would not differ from those of the conjunctions. However, it is 
unclear then how semantic and pragmatic modulation could help to 
account for the observed differences between connected and 
unconnected TT conditionals, given that true states of affairs are 
necessarily possible, and, consequently, there does not seem to be any 
difference in what kind of possibilities a person can envisage when 
interpreting TT conditionals with or without a connection. In both 
conditions, “it is possible that p and q” seems to be the only available 
option. 
Things do not look much better for the Suppositional Theory. The 
term Suppositional Theory is used to denote a family of related accounts 
of conditionals that share, and emphasise, the commitment to what has 
become known as The Equation, that is, the equality between the prob-
ability of a conditional and the corresponding conditional probability, 
Pr(If ​ p ​ then ​ q) = Pr(q |p). The Equation has become central to the 
New Paradigm psychology of reasoning due to the significant empirical 
support it has received (e.g., Evans, Handley, & Over, 2003; Fugard, 
Pfeifer, Mayerhofer, & Kleiter, 2011; Oaksford & Chater, 2007; Politzer, 
Over, & Baratgin, 2010). These studies show that, in reasoning experi-
ments, participants’ judgements of the probability of conditionals tend 
to equal their judgements of the corresponding conditional probability. 
However, as shown by Skovgaard-Olsen et al. (2016), this equality only 
holds as long as there is a connection, a reason relation—operational-
ised, in probabilistic terms, as positive relevance—between antecedents 
and consequents. Due to the triviality proofs by Lewis (1976) and 
others,16 the commitment to the Equation comes at a price. Some au-
thors gave up the view that conditionals can express propositions, that 
is, that they belong to those linguistic expressions that can be true or 
false at all (e.g. Adams, 1975; Edgington, 1995; Bennett, 2003). Many 
psychologists, however, advocate a view that combines the probabilistic 
approach with a three-valued truth table proposed by de Finetti (see, e. 
g., de Finetti, 1970). 
On the latter approach, the conditional is true when its antecedent 
and consequent are both true, and it is false when its antecedent is true 
but the consequent is false. When the antecedent is false, the conditional 
has no truth value—it is considered void—analogously to a conditional 
bet, which would be called-off when the condition expressed by the 
antecedent is not satisfied (for instance, when the coin whose landing is 
the object of a bet is not tossed at all; see, e.g., Politzer et al. (2010) for a 
comparison of conditionals and conditional bets). A refined version of 
the de Finetti’s proposal combines the three-valued logic with condi-
tional probability which replaces the value “void” for those conditionals 
that have false or undetermined antecedents (see, e.g., Baratgin et al., 
2013). 
Since conditionals used in our experiment all consist of antecedents 
and consequents that are all true, the probabilities do not play a role on 
this version of the Suppositional Theory, which then does not differ from 
the material account and, consequently, renders all those conditionals 
true. On the fully non-propositional approach, the conditional proba-
bility of the consequent of a TT conditional given its antecedent is 1, too, 
and hence such conditionals are highly acceptable. Reserving the 
probability values 1 and 0 to logical truths and logical falsehoods will 
not help, since Conjunctive Sufficiency is probabilistically valid, and 
hence the conditional whose clauses have probability values close to 1 
will be highly probable, and hence acceptable, too. To account for the 
results of our experiments, and for the intuition that the clauses of a 
conditional have to be connected, the Suppositional Theory needs to be 
supplemented by a pragmatic account. The most natural candidate for 
such an account is precisely the Gricean story that purported to explain 
the intuition that missing-link conditionals are faulty in terms of the 
availability of stronger, more informative statements. However, our 
experiments showed that a speaker’s being justified in asserting a 
conjunction of p and q, which, on the Suppositional Theory, is stronger, 
more informative than “if p then q,” does not suffice to render the 
conditional unassertable. It is the presence or absence of a connection 
16 See, e.g., (Bennett, 2003, Ch. 5) for a discussion of the triviality results and 
their consequences. 
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that makes a difference. The Gricean account fails to account for this 
result. 
One could argue that the connection between the antecedent and 
consequent of a conditional might still be conversationally implicated, 
as Grice (1989, p. 77) envisaged, even if we have failed so far to identify 
which Gricean maxims of good conversation, or which neo-Gricean 
principles (Horn, 1984) or heuristics (Levinson, 2000) missing-link 
conditionals actually violate. A seemingly promising suggestion was 
that the oddity of missing-link conditionals could be attributed to the 
violation of the Maxim of Relation which demands that whatever a 
speaker asserts be relevant in a given conversational context. However, 
as we have mentioned earlier, conditionals turned out to require a 
stronger type of a connection than what is sufficient to preserve the 
coherence of discourse (Krzyżanowska et al., 2017). More importantly, 
the results of another recent empirical study, by Skovgaard-Olsen et al. 
(2019), cast doubt on the very possibility of an explanation of the 
connection between antecedents and consequents in terms of conver-
sational implicatures. 
A key characteristic of conversational implicatures, as well as many 
other pragmatic phenomena, which distinguishes them from conven-
tional aspects of meaning, is their defeasibility. Conversational impli-
catures then can be cancelled, that is, a speaker whose assertion that φ 
conversationally implicates that ψ is in a position to call off the impli-
cature of ψ by clarifying that it was not the speaker’s intended meaning, 
for instance, by adding “I didn’t mean to say that ψ” (Grice, 1989; 
Blome-Tillmann, 2008).17 For example, a person asserting that “Some of 
our guests brought wine,” which tends to be interpreted as communi-
cating that not all of the guests brought wine, might cancel the impli-
cature of “not all” by adding “I didn’t mean to imply that some of the 
guests didn’t, I just don’t know what, if anything, the others brought.” 
By contrast, any attempt to cancel what an assertion semantically entails 
sounds like a speaker is contradicting themselves: one cannot assert 
“Tom and Jerry left the party” and then add “but I didn’t mean to imply 
that Jerry left the party.” Indeed, as shown by Skovgaard-Olsen et al. 
(2019), a speaker who attempts to cancel the connection between the 
antecedent and consequent of a conditional (e.g. “If Paul pushes down 
the brake pedal, then the car will slow down, but I am not suggesting 
that these two things are related”) is perceived as contradicting them-
selves, exactly like a speaker attempting to cancel what their assertion 
entails. Relatedly, implicatures can be reinforced (Saddock, 1978; 
Birner, 2012): “Not all of them did” asserted right after “Some of our 
guests brought wine” is not redundant—it makes explicit what has been 
merely suggested. By contrast, “Tom left the party” added after “Tom 
and Jerry left the party” is perceived as redundant, as it does not add any 
new information. A recent study by Rostworowski et al. (2021) shows 
that the connection, like semantic entailments and unlike conversational 
implicatures, is not reinforceable either.18 
Conversational implicature is by no means the only candidate for a 
pragmatic category to which a connection between the antecedents and 
consequents could possibly belong. However, of the pragmatic cate-
gories that could be easily integrated with the psychology of reasoning 
theories of conditionals we have discussed above, it is a category whose 
status as pragmatic might be the least controversial, although it has been 
argued that generalised conversational implicatures do contribute to the 
truth-conditional content of sentences that carry them (see, e.g., Lev-
inson, 2000). How else could the connection between a conditional’s 
antecedent and its consequent be accounted for, for it to be considered a 
pragmatic phenomenon? The short answer is: it depends. In particular, it 
depends on where we draw the line between the semantic and pragmatic 
aspects of meaning, if such a line is indeed possible to draw. 
While it is typical for researchers to try to decide between semantics 
and pragmatics (the aforementioned work by Skovgaard-Olsen et al., 
2019 is a good example), one could object that the attempt risks a false 
dichotomy. We have noted in the introduction that the pragmatic 
meaning of an expression has been traditionally contrasted with its se-
mantics, understood as the literal, conventional, and truth-conditional 
meaning of an expression, which is independent of context. Does the 
presence or absence, and strength, of an inferential connection affect the 
truth value of a given conditional? Evidence on this matter is mixed. On 
the one hand, Skovgaard-Olsen et al. (2017) argued that inferential 
connections contributed to judgments of probability and acceptability 
but not to judgments of truth. On the other hand, Douven et al. (2018) 
found that not only the presence or absence, but also the strength of 
inferential connections affected the participants’ truth value judgments, 
while Mirabile and Douven (2020) replicated that result for abductive 
inferential conditionals. Additionally, the latter showed that partici-
pants’ endorsement of the conclusion of the Modus Ponens inferences 
was better predicted by their judgments of the strength of the explana-
tory connection between the antecedent and consequent of the major 
premise of the argument than the corresponding conditional probability. 
The evidence collected by Krzyżanowska and Douven (2018), by 
contrast, is itself mixed. More data is clearly needed. It is also possible 
that people differ in how they interpret conditionals. A recent work by 
Skovgaard-Olsen et al. (2019), who studied individual variation in the 
interpretation of conditionals, deserves attention here. It shows that 
even participants who tend to interpret conditionals according to the 
Suppositional Theory largely reject the inferences from conjunction to 
conditionals, as predicted by inferentialism. Moreover, the endorsement 
of these inferences can be predicted by participants’ endorsement of an 
uncontroversially invalid inference of a conjunction from a single 
conjunct (see their Experiment 3). Nevertheless, even in an unlikely case 
that it is proven beyond doubt that the connection’s contribution to the 
truth-conditional content of a conditional is at best marginal, we would 
not be justified in drawing the conclusion that the connection is a clearly 
pragmatic phenomenon. 
Recent developments in linguistics and philosophy of language 
showed the traditionally construed semantics/pragmatics divide to be 
too simplistic (Korta & Perry, 2015). On the one hand, it became clear 
that pragmatic inferences are often necessary to establish the semantic, 
truth-conditional content of expressions, for instance, to disambiguate, 
to resolve the referents of indexicals, to recover unarticulated constit-
uents, and so on (see, e.g., Carston, 2002; Levinson, 2000; Recanati, 
2003; Jaszczolt, 2005 for a dicussion of pragmatic enrichment and 
related phenomena). On the other hand, it became clear that what an 
expression literally, conventionally conveys—what we might still want 
to call its “core” meaning—does not always belong to the truth- 
conditional content of sentences the expression appears in (see, e.g., 
Birner, 2012). In other words, what is semantic, conventional, and truth- 
conditional often diverge. By the same token, some phenomena do not 
sit neatly on only one side of the semantics/pragmatics divide; they sit 
on the fence. One fence-sitting phenomenon is the conventional impli-
cature (e.g. Bach, 1999; Potts, 2015), also known as the “semantic 
implicature” (Davis, 2014), which, as Skovgaard-Olsen et al. suggest, 
may house the inferential connection. The name of the phenomenon 
shows its fence sitting; it is both conventional and an implicature. To 
complicate the picture, Skovgaard-Olsen et al. (2019) collected evidence 
showing that inferential connections do seem to belong to content which 
is at issue. The at-issue content is what speakers accept or deny, which is 
typically identified with the truth-conditional content. Conventional 
implicatures are typically considered to be not-at-issue content, that is, 
for instance, they are not what a speaker accepts or denies when 
accepting or denying the sentence that carries them (Bach, 1999; Potts, 
2015; Tonhauser, 2012). 
Our data sit well with the view that the inferential connection 
17 Though see Haugh (2013) for a critical discussion of cancellability as a 
litmus test of implicature.  
18 See Saddock (1978) for a discussion of possible candidates for practical tests 
that could allow us to detect the presence of a conversational implicature. 
Krzyżanowska (2019) argues that the connection conveyed by indicative con-
ditional does not pass any of these tests. 
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belongs to the conventional meaning of the conditional. Whether it is 
construed as a part of the conditional’s truth-conditional content or as a 
conventional implicature carried by “if,” the inferential connection 
would be communicated out of any context of utterance, as we have seen 
in Experiments 2, 3, and 4. It would also be non-cancellable and non- 
reinforceable. Evidence, in particular the above discussed findings by 
Skovgaard-Olsen et al. (2019) and by Rostworowski et al. (2021), sug-
gest it is neither. Lastly, our evidence suggests that the inferential 
connection is special to the conditional—it does not noticeably benefit 
conjunctions and disjunctions—it does not seem to depend on a specific 
conversational context; and it affects a more semantic dependent vari-
able. Needless to say, we do not claim that our results conclusively rule 
out any conceivable strictly pragmatic account of the connection. Other 
purely pragmatic accounts of our data may eventually be formulated. 
However, the current data, particularly in conjunction with other find-
ings discussed above, provide important constraints. 
Note that conjunctions can also have a conditional, inferential 
interpretation, and thus might be said to express the presence of a 
connection too, as in: “You walk with me and I will tell you all about it” 
or “You push down the break pedal and the car will slow down.” 
However, in such cases, even if these sentences indeed convey that there 
is a connection between the conjuncts, its status is clearly different. The 
data collected by Skovgaard-Olsen et al. (2019) indicate that the 
connection is cancellable when it is conveyed by a conjunction: a 
speaker who states “Paul is wearing a shirt, and his car will suddenly 
break down, but I am not suggesting that these two things are related” is 
not judged by the participants to be contradicting themselves (unlike a 
speaker asserting “If Paul is wearing a shirt, then the car will slow down, 
but I am not suggesting that these two things are related”). This suggests 
that the inferential reading of a conjunction, unlike that of an indicative 
conditional, has the signature of a conversational implicature. 
As we have explained above, more data are needed to decide 
whether inferential connections contribute towards judgments of truth. 
If they do contribute, then the inferential connections would belong to 
semantics as it has been traditionally construed: the conventional, truth- 
conditional content. If they do not contribute, then conventional 
implicatures seem a strong contender. While we cannot entirely rule out 
the possibility of yet another pragmatic account of the connection being 
advanced, we have provided reasons to believe that the inferential 
connections belong to what conditionals conventionally mean—what in 
psychology of reasoning is usually dubbed as their “core” meaning. In 
light of our experiments together with a growing number of other 
empirical results on the semantics and pragmatics of conditionals, the 
view that inferential connections can be explained away on merely 
pragmatic grounds becomes less and less plausible. 
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